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Abstract—Industry 4.0 is the latest industrial revolution pri-
marily merging automation with advanced manufacturing to
reduce direct human effort and resources. Predictive maintenance
(PdM) is an industry 4.0 solution, which facilitates predicting
faults in a component or a system powered by state-of-the-
art machine learning (ML) algorithms (especially deep learning
algorithms) and the Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors. However,
IoT sensors and deep learning (DL) algorithms, both are known
for their vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks. In the context of PdM
systems, such attacks can have catastrophic consequences as they
are hard to detect due to the nature of the attack. To date, the
majority of the published literature focuses on the accuracy of DL
enabled PdM systems and often ignores the effect of such attacks.
In this paper, we demonstrate the effect of IoT sensor attacks (in
the form of false data injection attack) on a PdM system. At first,
we use three state-of-the-art DL algorithms, specifically, Long
Short-Term Memory (LSTM), Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU),
and Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) for predicting the
Remaining Useful Life (RUL) of a turbofan engine using NASA’s
C-MAPSS dataset. The obtained results show that the GRU-based
PdM model outperforms some of the recent literature on RUL
prediction using the C-MAPSS dataset. Afterward, we model and
apply two different types of false data injection attacks (FDIA),
specifically, continuous and interim FDIAs on turbofan engine
sensor data and evaluate their impact on CNN, LSTM, and GRU-
based PdM systems. The obtained results demonstrate that FDI
attacks on even a few IoT sensors can strongly defect the RUL
prediction in all cases. However, the GRU-based PdM model
performs better in terms of accuracy and resiliency to FDIA.
Lastly, we perform a study on the GRU-based PdM model using
four different GRU networks with different sequence lengths.
Our experiments reveal an interesting relationship between the
accuracy, resiliency and sequence length for the GRU-based PdM
models.
Index Terms—deep learning, false data injection attack, LSTM,
GRU, CNN, industry 4.0, Internet of things, machine learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Current advances in machine learning (ML) techniques and
Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors has enabled the emergence of
predictive maintenance (PdM), which is a method of prevent-
ing asset failure by analyzing production data and identifying
patterns to predict issues before they happen. State-of-the-
art PdM techniques can help reduce downtime by 35%-45%,
maintenance cost by 20%-25%, and can increase production by
20%-25% [1]. Due to these benefits, IoT and ML-enabled PdM
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solutions are reshaping automotive, aerospace, oil and gas,
transportation, manufacturing industries and also reshaping the
national defense. Specifically, deep learning (DL) algorithms
have recently shown tremendous success in such PdM appli-
cations [2]. Unfortunately, IoT sensors and DL algorithms are
both susceptible to attacks [3], which poses a significant threat
to the overall PdM system. According to a recent report from
the Malwarebytes, cyber-threats against businesses/factories
have increased by more than 200% over the past year [4].
Specifically, it is very hard to detect stealthy attacks, such
as False Data Injection Attack (FDIA) [5] on the PdM system
due to the nature of the attack. In false data injection attack
(FDIA) [5], an attacker stealthily compromises measurements
from IoT sensors (by a very small margin), such that the
manipulated sensor measurements bypass the sensor’s basic
‘faulty data’ detection mechanism and propagates to the sensor
output undetected. An FDI attack can be implemented by
compromising physical sensors, sensor communication net-
work, and data processing programs. Such attacks on a PdM
system may not even show their impact. Instead, the attack
propagates from the sensor to the ML part of the PdM system
and fools the system by predicting a delayed asset failure or
maintenance interval. This might incur a significant cost by
inducing an unplanned failure or loss of human lives in safety-
critical applications [6]–[8].
FDI attacks have already caused many known disastrous
incidents, such as the Northeast blackout of 2003 in the USA
and the Ukrainian power grid attack affecting over 230,000
people, leaving them without electricity for several hours.
Extensive research has been performed on the detection and
mitigation of FDI attacks in cyber-physical systems (CPS)
domain [9]–[11]. Unfortunately, the effect of FDIA on a PdM
system is yet not explored which motivates our research. In
the case of aircraft engine PdM systems, FDIAs may result
in the delay of timely maintenance and lead to mid-air engine
failures which are catastrophic. Current users of PdM systems
for aircraft engine maintenance include Pratt and Whitney,
Rolls-Royce, Honeywell, General electronics and the US Air
force [6], [12]–[14]. For example, Bombardiers new jetliner
uses a Pratt and Whitney turbofan engine that boasted more
than 5,000 sensors [15], [16]. Powered with the modern
DL algorithms, this engine can predict the future demands
of the engine, perform adjustments, and thus save 15%
of fuel usage. However, the vulnerability of sensor-attacks
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Fig. 1: Engine health monitoring (EHM) system architecture
against for such IoT and ML-based engines is considered a
challenge [15], [17], [18]. The existing sensor attack detection
solutions in the IoT and cyber-physical system domain is
not sufficient to address this problem due to the fact that,
when deployed individually to the thousands of sensors, most
of the existing techniques suffer from scalability problems
and resource overheads as many IoT sensors are power and
resource-constrained.
Contribution of this paper: In this paper, we model continuous
and interim FDIAs on IoT sensors and show their impact on a
PdM model by performing a case study on the aircraft Predic-
tive Maintenance (PdM) system. We use the C-MAPSS [19]
(Commercial Modular Aero-Propulsion System Simulation)
dataset1. At first, to build an accurate predictive model, we
train the Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM), Gated recurrent
unit (GRU), and Convolutional neural network (CNN) algo-
rithms using the C-MAPSS dataset. We evaluate these three
predictive models, and the obtained results show that the GRU-
based model predicts the Remaining Useful Life (RUL)2 most
accurately. The obtained results from the GRU-based model
outperforms the recent works that use DL for RUL prediction
using the C-MAPSS dataset in [20]–[22] (by predicting RUL
1.3-1.9 times more accurately).
Afterward, we model two types of false data injection
attacks (FDIA) on the C-MAPSS dataset and evaluate their
impact on CNN, LSTM, and GRU-based PdM models. To be
more realistic, we model attack only on 3 sensors among the
21 sensors in the turbofan engine. The obtained results show
that all the PdM models are greatly defected by the FDIA
even if only 3 out of the 21 sensors are attacked. However,
the GRU-based PdM model is comparatively more accurate
and resilient to FDIA when compared to the other evaluated
PdM models. In terms of sensitivity, we also explore that
CNN is way more sensitive to FDIAs when compared to the
LSTM and GRU. This is indeed an important observation
1a popular turbofan engine degradation dataset published by NASA’s
Prognostics Center of Excellence (PCoE)
2Remaining useful life (RUL) is the length of time a machine is likely to
operate before it requires repair or replacement.
since CNN-based techniques are quite popular in asset
maintenance [23]–[25] and our results indicate that special
measures should be taken for designing a CNN-based PdM.
Afterward, we analyze the GRU-based PdM model using
four different sequence lengths. The obtained results show an
interesting relationship between the accuracy, the resiliency
and the sequence length of the models. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work that demonstrates the effects
of IoT sensor attacks on a deep learning-enabled PdM system.
Paper organization: The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. Section II briefly discusses the Engine Health Mon-
itoring (EHM) systems and Predictive Maintenance (PdM).
Section III introduces the DL algorithms used in this paper:
LSTM, GRU, and CNN, and also describes NASA’s C-MAPSS
dataset used for our experiment. Section IV describes the mod-
eling of FDIA in detail. Section V compares the performance
of CNN, LSTM, and GRU in predicting RUL and analyses
the impact on RUL prediction using CNN, LSTM, and GRU
after both continuous and interim FDI. Section VI presents
the observations from those obtained results, and Section VII
concludes the paper.
II. ENGINE HEALTH MONITORING (EHM) SYSTEM
A. Engine health monitoring (EHM) system
An aircraft engine is a complex system, so it requires
adequate monitoring to ensure safe operation and in-time
maintenance [26]. Several displays and dials in the cockpit
give different measurements like exhaust gas temperatures,
engine pressure ratio, the pressure at fan inlet, rotational
speeds, etc. All these parameters are crucial in indicating the
health of the engine; they serve as early indicators of failure
and prevent costly component damage. In order to accomplish
the task of monitoring these parameters in an engine, Engine
health monitoring (EHM) systems [27] have been in service
for three decades. Fig. 1 shows a generic EHM architecture.
An EHM system has several IoT (Internet of Things) sensors
mounted inside and outside of an engine to monitor different
parameters. All these IoT sensors are connected to a wireless
network [28], which uses radiofrequency for transmitting
sensor output to central engine control [28]. These IoT sensors
monitor different parameters of an aircraft engine and send out
alerts to the engine manufacturer if the RUL [29] of the engine
is approaching its end of life. An EHM system employs PdM
systems to predict the RUL using the data collected from the
IoT sensors.
The sensors on-board the engine send time-series data
(cycles) every hour to the local storage on-board the airplane.
After every Nb cycles of data are captured, the data is transmit-
ted to the ground station. At the ground station, the incoming
live data is stored in the database and sent to the PdM system
to predict RUL of the engine. The PdM system sends out alerts
if the predicted RUL is less than the permissible safe operation
RUL of the engine.
B. Predictive maintenance (PdM)
In manufacturing supply chains, unexpected failures are
considered as primary operational risk as it can hinder pro-
ductivity and can incur huge losses. For example, in the
modern automotive industry, an assembly line has several
robots working on a car, and even if one of the robots fails,
it will result in the total halt of the assembly line, causing
loss of valuable production time and money. To overcome this
problem, PdM strategies are employed. PdM is an industry 4.0
solution, which assists in predicting the future state of physical
assets. It helps in better-informed maintenance decisions, to
prevent unexpected delays.
PdM systems are employed in major industries like Nu-
clear power plants, aviation industry, automotive industry, and
health care services. PdM allows for convenient scheduling
of corrective maintenance as parts for the equipment can be
ordered beforehand to avoid the last-minute hassle, which
saves a lot of valuable production time. PdM is well suited
for making an informed decision when dealing with time-
series data. A data-driven model of PdM employs some of the
remarkable strategies like the Random Forest algorithm [30],
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) [31], fuzzy models [32],
Big data frameworks [33]. In this paper, three deep learning
algorithms, specifically, LSTM, GRU, and CNN are employed
in predicting RUL of an aircraft engine.
III. DL ALGORITHMS FOR RUL PREDICTION
As mentioned earlier, RUL can be predicted using different
ML algorithms. For this paper, we utilize LSTM, GRU, and
CNN algorithms and compare their performance.
A. Long short-term memory model (LSTM)
An LSTM [34] is a special kind of Recursive Neural
Network (RNN), capable of learning long-term dependencies.
LSTM is explicitly designed to avoid long term dependency
problems, which is prevalent in RNN. It has achieved great
praise in the field of machine learning and speech recognition.
Some of the neural networks have a dependency problem,
but an LSTM can overcome the problem of dependency by
controlling the flow of information using input, output and
forget gate. The input gate controls the flow of input activation
into the memory cell. The output gate controls the output flow
of cell activation into the rest of the network.
Suppose that training data has N equipment of the same
make and type that provide failure data, and each equipment
provides set multivariate time-series data from the sensors
of the equipment. Also, assume that there are r sensors
of the same type on each equipment. Then data collected
from each equipment can be represented in a matrix form
Xn = [x1, x2, ..., xt, ..., xTn ] ∈ Rr×Tn (n = 1, ..., N) where
Tn is time of the failure and at time t the r-dimensional
vector of sensor measurements is xt = [s1t , ..., s
r
t ] ∈ Rr×1, t =
1, 2, ..., Tn. The data of each equipment in Xn is fed to LSTM
network and the network learns how to model the whole
sequence with respect to target RUL. At time t, LSTM network
takes r-dimensional sensor data xt and gives predicted RULt.
Let the LSTM cell has q nodes, then ct ∈ Rq×1 is output
of cell state, ht ∈ Rq×1 is output of LSTM cell, ot ∈ Rq×1 is
output gate, it ∈ Rq×1 is input gate, and ft ∈ Rq×1 is forget
gate at time t. At time t−1, the output ht−1, and hidden state
ct−1 will serve as input to LSTM cell at time t. The input xt
is fed as input to the cell. In LSTM, the normalized data are
calculated using the following equations:
it = σ(Wi · [ht−1, xt] + bi), (1)
ft = σ(Wf · [ht−1, xt] + bf ), (2)
ot = σ(Wo · [ht−1, xt] + bo), (3)
c˜t = act(Wc · [ht−1, xt] + bc), (4)
ct = ft ∗ ct−1 + it ∗ c˜t, (5)
ht = ot ∗ act(ct), (6)
Where σ is the sigmoid layer. ct and c˜t are each internal
memory cell and temporary value to make a new internal
memory cell at time t. ∗ is element-wise multiplication of
two vectors.
B. Gated recurrent unit (GRU)
The GRU was proposed by Cho et al. [35]. It operates using
a reset gate and an update gate. The GRU is an improved
version of standard recurrent neural networks. Similar to the
LSTM unit, the GRU has gating units that modulate the flow
of information, however, without having a separate memory
cell. GRU’s performance on certain tasks of polyphonic music
modeling and speech signal modeling was found to be similar
to that of LSTM. GRUs have been shown to exhibit even better
performance on certain smaller datasets. [36]. The memory
block of GRU is simpler than that of LSTM. The forget, input
and output gates are replaced with an update and a reset gate.
Also, GRU combines the hidden state and the internal memory
cell. In GRU, the normalized data are calculated using the
following equations:
zt = σ(Wz · [ht−1, xt] + bz), (7)
rt = σ(Wr · [ht−1, xt] + br), (8)
h˜t = act(W · [rt ∗ ht−1, xt] + bh), (9)
ht = (1− zt) ∗ ht−1 + zt ∗ h˜t, (10)
where zt and rt are the update gate and reset gate at time
t, respectively. h˜t is a temporary value to make new hidden
state at time t.
C. Convolutional neural network (CNN)
CNN a deep learning algorithm has achieved exceptional
success in various research fields [37] because it has many
advantages over traditional machine learning approaches such
as MLP [38]. CNNs are fundamentally inspired from feed-
forward ANNs. Like any other advanced DL algorithm, CNN
also finds its applications in different areas including CNN-
based PdM system [23]–[25]. A CNN consists of one or more
convolutional layers and then followed by one or more fully
connected layers as in a standard multi-layer neural network.
A 1D CNN model is utilized in this paper to predict the RUL
of the engine. Details about CNN construction and network
design are presented in detail in [39].
D. C-MAPSS dataset
To evaluate the performance of the CNN, LSTM, and GRU
DL algorithms, we use a well-known dataset, NASA’s turbofan
engine degradation simulation dataset C-MAPSS (Commercial
Modular Aero-Propulsion System Simulation). This dataset
includes 21 sensor data with different number of operating
conditions and fault conditions3. In this dataset, there are four
sub-datasets (FD001-04). Every subset has training data and
test data. The test data has run to failure data from several
engines of the same type. Each row in test data is a time cycle
which can be defined as an hour of operation. A time cycle
has 26 columns where the 1st column represents the engine
ID, and the 2nd column represents the current operational
cycle number. The columns from 3 to 5 represent the three
operational settings and columns from 6-26 represent the 21
sensor values. The time-series data terminates only when a
fault is encountered. For example, an engine with ID 1 has 192
time cycles of data, which means the engine has developed a
fault at the 192nd time cycle. The test data contains data only
for some time cycles as our goal is to estimate the remaining
operational time cycles before a fault.
IV. MODELING OF FDIA
In this section, we describe the modeling of FDIAs,
attacker’s objective, and the attack scenarios in detail.
False data injection attack (FDIA): As mentioned earlier,
false data injection attack (FDIA) [5] can be injected into
the system by compromising physical sensors, sensor data
communication links, and data processing programs. Compro-
mising physical sensors requires physical access to the sensors
and hence is a tedious task. In contrast, hacking the sensor
data communication links and data processing programs is
an easier option for an attacker (explained in detail in the
attack surface of this section). A successful FDIA can cause
the engine sensors to output erroneous values to the central
engine control, and thus make either physical or economic
impact on the predictive maintenance model. For example,
Xi represents the information transmitted by the ith sensor.
In an FDIA, the adversary contaminates the original vector
with a vicious vector. Let Xi = [x1, x2, ..., xk] be the original
vector data containing k sensor reading for the ith sensor.
The original vector could be contaminated by adding an FDIA
vector with the same dimension as the original vector. Let the
contaminated vector for the ith sensor be Fi = [λ1, λ2, ..., λk],
then the compromised vector is given by Eq. 11.
Zi = Xi + Fi (11)
An FDIA can be constrained, where the attacker has
access to a limited number of sensors, and some part of
the communication network and an FDIA can also be
unconstrained, where the attacker has access to all of the
sensors and also has total control of the communication
3More details about these 21 sensors can be found in [40] and [41]
network. In this work, we consider the constrained attack
since it is more practical that an attacker has access to
only a limited number of sensors (for the case study,
the attack scenario considers only 3 sensors from a total
of 21 sensors). We model two variations of FDIAs to
explore and compare their impact, specifically, continuous
FDIA and interim FDIA. In the case of continuous FDIA,
the attack is continuous, which means, once the attack
starts, from that point onwards all the sensor readings are
compromised. For instance, if the attack starts at the time
instant atck start = 3 and ends at atck end then Fi can be
expressed as Fi = [λ1, λ2, λatck start, ..., λatck end], where
atck start ≥ 1 and atck end = k . In the case of interim
FDIA, the duration of attack is a short time interval, where
atck start > 1 and atck end < k.
Attacker’s stealthiness: An FDIA can be stealthy if it is not
detected by the defense mechanism. In order to achieve that
objective, the attack vector should remain in the boundary
conditions of the sensor measurements. There exist constant
vectors Zmin and Zmax, such that for any FDIA vector Zi, the
compromised vector passes undetected through the defense if
Zi = Xi + Fi and Zmin ≤ Zi ≤ Zmax (12)
We assume the attacker knows Zmin and Zmax to construct
attack vectors satisfying Eq.12. Such information is easily
available from the sensor data sheets provided by the vendor.
Attacker’s objective: The attacker’s objective is to cause
a delay in aircraft engine maintenance. This objective can
be achieved by altering the IoT sensors readings that are
fed to the PdM systems. Injecting false data to the sensor
readings result in incorrect predictions from PdM systems
which in turn results in a delay of timely maintenance. As
timely maintenance is a crucial factor in engine performance,
a lapse of maintenance may result in mid-air engine failures
which are catastrophic. One can argue that the attacker having
access to the physical sensors or the communication network
of the sensors would directly attack the main systems (flight
navigation and instrument landing systems) rather than just
altering the sensor values for the PdM. However, there is a
higher chance that a direct attack on the main system will
easily get detected by the defense mechanisms. In contrast,
introducing FDIA to sensors is a safer option for an attacker
since such attacks are more stealthy, hard to detect as they
are in the sensor’s acceptable range. Thus, such attacks
will cause an erroneous calculation of the RUL and might
delay the maintenance cycle leading to a catastrophic incident.
Attack surface: In this paper, only the constrained attacks
are considered. Note, one of the ways to launch an FDIA is
using spoofing techniques. For instance, Tippenhauer et al.
[42] showed a spoof attack scenario on GPS-enabled devices.
In this attack scenario, a forged GPS signal is transmitted to
the device to alter the location. In this way, the true location of
the device is disguised and the attacker can perform a physical
attack on the device. In another work, Giannetos et al. [43]
introduced an app named Spy-sense, which monitors behaviors
of several sensors in a device. The app can manipulate sensor
data by deleting or modifying it. Spy-sense exploits the active
memory region in a device and relays sensitive data covertly.
These works show that FDI attacks can be performed even
without gaining direct access to a system.
One of the recent articles [44] considers cyber-attacks as
one of the reasons behind the two recent Boeing 737 Max
8 crashes. According to that article, a passenger, vehicle or
drone carrying a sonic device capable of impacting the MCAS
sensor controlling the plane could have been responsible for
such an attack. Recently, ICS-CERT published an alert on
certain controlled area network (CAN) bus systems aboard
aircraft that might be vulnerable to hacking. It cited a report
that an attacker with access to the aircraft could attach a
device to avionics CAN bus to inject false data, resulting in
incorrect readings in an avionic equipment [45]. Using such
a device attached to the bus could lead to incorrect engine
telemetry readings, compass, altitude, airspeed, and angle of
attack (AoA) data. Pilots might not be able to distinguish
between false and legitimate readings. This alert explores the
possibility of injecting false data into IoT sensor readings
of aircraft engine which are transmitted on a CAN. In this
work we consider FDIA using a malicious device attached to
avionics CAN.
Attack scenario: As shown in Fig. 1 of the EHM architecture,
the aircraft sends Nb cycles of data at a time to the ground
station/engine manufacturer. At the ground station, the PdM
system performs data analytics on the received data and send
out alerts if the RUL is close to the threshold Nth. The value
of Nth can vary from engine to engine, and it is manufacturer-
dependant. An adversary having this knowledge can perform
the attacks more effectively. In a more practical sense, the
degradation of the engine is very negligible at the beginning,
but as time proceeds, the degradation follows a linear trend,
and it increases as the engine approaches the end of life.
Assuming in an engine, the linear degradation initially starts at
Nd cycle. The value of Nd is different for different engines, as
the wear of the engines may be different. If the average of Nd
for all the engines in the dataset is taken, it is found to be Ndavg .
An adversary knowing Ndavg can perform the attacks after the
degradation initiates, making the attack more destructive.
To study the impact of FDIA on PdM systems, we consider
an attack scenario where the attacker has access to the aircraft
and could attach a device to avionics CAN bus [45] as men-
tioned previously in section IV (attack surface). The device
attached to CAN bus can inject false data into engine sensor
readings, resulting in incorrect predictions of RUL of the
aircraft engine. Note, as mentioned in section (attack surface),
it is also possible to launch an FDI attack without direct access
to the aircraft by using the sensor spoofing technique [46], or
using a drone carrying a special device capable of interfering
and impacting the on-board aircraft sensor measurements [44].
In this work, we consider two variations of FDIA which are
continuous and interim FDIA. In continuous FDIA, the attack
is initiated after Nd and continues to the end-of-life of the
engine. In Interim FDIA, the attack is initiated after Nd and
continues to the next 20 time cycles. In both the variations of
FDIA, random and biased FDIAs are used to evaluate the PdM
model’s performance. Here, random FDIA means the noise
added to the sensor output has a range (0.01% to 0.05%).
Whereas, biased FDIA has a constant amount of noise added
to the sensor output.
Atack intiated
Fig. 2: Continuous FDIA signature
Atack intiated
Fig. 3: Interim FDIA signature
TABLE I: RMSE comparison for different DL algorithms
Predictor architecture RMSE
Test
CNN(64,64,64.64) lh(100) 9.94
LSTM(100,100,100,100) lh(80) 8.76
GRU(100,100,100) lh(80) 7.26
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we first compare different DL algorithms
on RUL prediction. Next, we present both continuous and
interim FDIA signatures, and the impact of attacks on the
RUL prediction. Lastly, we present piece-wise RUL prediction
and detail the impact of sequence length on resiliency. For the
sake of reproducibility and to allow the research community
to build on our findings, the artifacts (source code, datasets,
etc.) of the following experiments are publicly available on
our GitHub repository4.
4https://github.com/dependable-cps/FDIA-PdM
(a) GRU during attack; random FDIA’s
RMSE=25.69, biased FDIA’s RMSE=22.92
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(b) LSTM during attack; random FDIA’s
RMSE=27.25, biased FDIA’s RMSE=25.07
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(c) CNN during attack; random FDIA’s
RMSE=57.42, biased FDIA’s RMSE=33.99
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Fig. 4: Piece-wise RUL prediction for Interim FDIA
(a) GRU(100,100,100), lh(80), RMSE=7.26
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(b) LSTM(100,100,100,100), lh(80), RMSE=8.76
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(c) CNN(64,64,64,64), lh(100), RMSE=9.94
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Fig. 5: Comparison of deep learning algorithmsFig. 4: Comparison of deep learning algorithms
A. Comparison of deep learning algorithms
In order to select the best machine learning algorithm for
the PdM, we compare LSTM, GRU, and CNN algorithms for
the C-MAPSS dataset. To evaluate the performance of the pre-
dictors, we utilize the root mean square error (RMSE) metric
which is widely used as an evaluation metric in model eval-
uation studies. Fig. 4 and Table I represents the comparison
of DL algorithms with architectures LSTM(100,100,100,100)
lh(80), GRU(100,100,100) lh(80), and CNN(64,64,64,64)
lh(100). The notation GRU(100,100,100) lh(80) refers to a
network that has 100 nodes in the hidden layers of the first
GRU layer, 100 nodes in the hidden layers of the second
GRU layer, 100 nodes in the hidden layers of the third GRU
layer, and a sequence length of 80. In the end, there is a 1-
dimensional output layer. Table II shows the hyperparameters
for the developed CNN, LSTM and GRU models (inspired
from [22] and [39], with additional experiments to check the
feasibility of the adopted hyperparameters).
TABLE II: Hyperparameter settings
Model Hidden
neuron
Dropout Batch
size
Epochs Act.
func.
CNN 64 0.2 200 100 ReLu
LSTM 100 0.2 200 100 tanh
GRU 100 0.2 200 100 tanh
From Fig. 4 and Table I it is evident that the DL algorithm
GRU(100, 100, 100) with a sequence length 80 has the least
RMSE of 7.26. It means that GRU is very accurate in predict-
ing accurate RUL for this dataset. Note, the obtained results in
Table I show that our GRU-based predictive model performs
1.9, 1.7 and 1.3 times better (in terms of accuracy) when
compared to the recent works in [20], [22], [47], respectively,
on RUL estimation using DL algorithms and the C-MAPSS
dataset. In the next step, we model FDIA on CNN, LSTM,
and GRU to evaluate their resiliency to the FDIA.
B. Impact of attacks on a PdM system
The average degradation point of the engine Ndavg is
considered as 130 for the FD001 dataset [48] [49] [50],
and we assume that the Engine Health Monitoring (EHM)
system of the aircraft sends 20-time cycles (Nb) of data to
the ground at a time as shown in Fig. 1. The train and test
dataset have 21 sensor data. The FDIA can be performed
on 21 sensors, but to make the attack more realistic, we
perform FDIA on only 3 sensors (specifically, T24, T50, and
P30). Details about these 21 sensors can be found in [41].
In FDIA continuous scenario, the attacker has initiated the
attacks after Ndavg , which is 130-time cycles (a one-time
cycle is equivalent of one flight hour), and the attack duration
is until end of life of the engine. In FDIA interim scenario,
the attacker has initiated the attacks after Ndavg , which is
130-time cycles, and the attack duration is 20 hours (20-time
cycles). Since the attack is initiated after 130-time cycles, we
only consider the engines which have data for more than 130
cycles which gives us 37 engines in the FD001 dataset. The
resultant dataset is re-evaluated using the LSTM, CNN and
GRU-based PdM models and the obtained RMSEs are 6.09,
7.50, and 5.36, respectively.
FDIA signature: To model the FDIA on sensors, we add
a vicious vector to the original vector, which modifies the
sensor output by a very small margin (0.01% to 0.05%) for
random FDIA and 0.02% for biased FDIA. Here, random
FDIA means the noise added to the sensor output has a range
(0.01% to 0.05%). Whereas, biased FDIA has a constant
amount of noise added to the sensor output. Fig. 2 shows the
comparison between the original and biased FDIA attacked
output signal of sensor 2 for engine ID 3 for a continuous
period. In continuous FDIA, we attack the sensor output
from time cycles 130 to the end-of-life of the engine. In the
case of biased FDIA for an interim period as shown in Fig.
3, the attack duration is only for 20 time cycles (130 to 150
time cycles). Note, in the constrained attack the adversary
has limited access to sensors. As shown in Fig. 2 and 3, the
attack signature is very similar to the original signal, making
it stealthy and harder to detect even with common defense
mechanisms in place.
Impact of FDIA on CNN, LSTM and GRU: To show the
impact of an FDIA on the aircraft PdM system, we implement
an attack for the scenario mentioned previously in Section IV
(attack scenario). The FDIA is performed on three sensors
(T24, T50, and P30) instead of attacking all the 21 sensors
in the dataset. In FDIA continuous scenario, the adversary
performs attacks from 130-time cycles to end of life of the
engine. It is evident from Fig. 5 that LSTM, GRU, and CNN
(a) CNN during attack, random FDIA’s
RMSE=139.15, biased FDIA’s RMSE=85.07
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(c) GRU during attack, random FDIA’s
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Fig. 1: FDI attack scenario for continuous period
(a) CNN during attack, random FDIA’s
RMSE=46.91, biased FDIA’s RMSE=31.46
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(b) LSTM during attack, random FDIA’s
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(c) GRU during attack, random FDIA’s
RMSE=19.30, biased FDIA’s RMSE=17.64
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Fig. 2: FDI attack scenario for interim period
(a) GRU during attack; random FDIA’s
RMSE=48.45, biased FDIA’s RMSE=32.51
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(b) LSTM during attack; random FDIA’s
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(c) CNN during attack; random FDIA’s
RMSE=135.43, biased FDIA’s RMSE=83.04
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Fig. 3: Piece-wise RUL prediction for continuous FDIA
Fig. 5: FDI attack scenario for continuous period
(a) CNN during attack, random FDIA’s
RMSE=139.15, biased FDIA’s RMSE=85.07
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(a) CNN during attack, random FDIA’s
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(a) GRU during attack; random FDIA’s
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Fig. 3: Piece-wise RUL prediction for continuous FDIA
Fig. 6: FDI attack scenario for interim period
(a) CNN during attack, random FDIA’s
RMSE=139.15, biased FDIA’s RMSE=85.07
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(b) LSTM during attack, random FDIA’s
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(c) GRU during attack, random FDIA’s
RMSE=43.8, biased FDIA’s RMSE=35.38
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(a) GRU during attack; random FDIA’s
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Fig. 3: Piece-wise RUL prediction for continuous FDIAFig. 7: Piece-wise RU prediction for continuous FDIA
are greatly affected by the continuous FDI attack. In the
case of random and biased FDIA, random FDIA showed a
considerable impact on all PdM models. The CNN based PdM
model is the most affected by the continuous FDIA as random
FDIA’s RMSE is 139.15 and biased FDIA’s RMSE is 85.07
(true RMSE is 7.50) which is almost 18 times and 11 times
higher when compared to the true RMSE, respectively. In
contrast, the GRU based PdM model is the least affected by the
continuous FDIA as random FDIA’s RMSE is 43.8 and biased
FDIA’s RMSE is 35.38 (true RMSE is 5.36). Even though
the GRU is least affected by both random and biased FDIA,
their RMSE is 8 and 6 times higher than the true RMSE,
respectively, making it also deadly for a PdM system.
In the FDIA interim scenario, the adversary performs attacks
between 130 and 150-time cycles (20-time cycles). It is evident
from Fig. 6 that LSTM, GRU, and CNN are greatly affected
by the interim FDI attack. Once again, the CNN based PdM
model is greatly affected by the continuous FDIA as random
FDIA’s RMSE is 46.91 and biased FDIA’s RMSE is 31.46
(true RMSE is 7.50) which is almost 6 times and 4 times
higher than the true RMSE, respectively. In contrast, the GRU
based PdM model is the least affected by the interim FDIA
as random FDIA’s RMSE is 19.30 and biased FDIA’s RMSE
is 17.64 (true RMSE is 5.36). This indicates that GRU-based
PdM models are comparatively resilient to both continuous
and interim FDIA. Even though the GRU is least affected by
(a) GRU during attack; random FDIA’s
RMSE=25.69, biased FDIA’s RMSE=22.92
0 50 100 150 200
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
• Attack initiated
Time Cycle
Pr
ed
ic
te
d
R
U
L
in
cy
cl
es
True RUL
Piece-wise RUL
Random FDIA
Biased FDIA
(b) LSTM during attack; random FDIA’s
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(c) CNN during attack; random FDIA’s
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Fig. 4: Piece-wise RUL prediction for Interim FDIAFig. 8: Piece-wise RUL prediction for Interim FDIA
both random and biased FDIA, their RMSE is still 4 times
and 3 times higher than the true RMSE, respectively, making
it deadly for a PdM system. When comparing both continuous
and interim FDIA, it observed that continuous FDIA’s RMSE
is almost twice the interim FDIA’s RMSE. Hence, continuous
FDIAs are more potent than interim FDIA.
C. Piece-wise RUL prediction
In order to show the impact of FDIA attacks on a specific
engine data, we apply the piece-wise RUL prediction. The
piece-wise RUL prediction gives a better visual representation
of degradation in an aircraft engine. Fig. 7(a) shows an
example of an engine data from the dataset of 100 engines,
and depicts the predicted RUL using GRU at each time step
of that engine data. For example, if X is the time series
data of a particular engine, then Xi = [x1, x2, x3...xt−k]
represents time series data until time t−k. RULp is predicted
RUL at each time step in X , which is can be defined as
RULpi = [RUL
p
1, RUL
p
2, RUL
p
3...RUL
p
t−k]. From Fig. 7(a),
it is evident that as the time series approaches the end of life,
the predicted RUL (red line) is close to the true RUL (blue
dashes), because the DL model has more time series data to
accurately predict the RUL.
In the case of piece-wise RUL prediction during continuous
FDIA, it is observed from Fig. 7 that both random and
biased FDIAs are initiated from 130-time cycles to 242-
time cycles for engine ID 17. Here, the green and yellow
dashes in the figures are predicted RUL after random and
biased FDIA, respectively. In the GRU, LSTM, and CNN
based piece-wise RUL prediction (for both random and biased
FDIA), the attacker initiates the FDIA after 130-time cycles.
The impact of the attack is quite interesting as the RUL
jumps upwards (around 200 for GRU and LSTM) with a
possible indication to the engine maintenance operator that the
engine is quite healthy. This may influence a ‘no maintenance
required’ decision from the maintenance engineers’ point of
view, however, in reality, the RUL is decreasing continuously
and going below the 100-time cycles which might require to
schedule urgent maintenance leading to a catastrophic event.
For CNN, the continuous FDIA causes a longer jump (even
beyond the initial RUL value) when compared to the FDIA in
LSTM and GRU. Of course, there is a higher chance that this
will be flagged as a potential fault either in the engine or in the
PdM system, and will cause unnecessary engine maintenance
and will increase the aircraft downtown causing a financial
loss to the flight operator.
In the case of piece-wise RUL prediction for engine ID 17
under interim FDIA, it is observed in Fig. 8 that the attack
causes a similar jump as shown in the case of continuous
FDIA in Fig. 7. However, the effect of the attack flushes away
way sooner when compared to the continuous FDIA case.
However, note that the attack duration was only 20 cycles,
but it took more than 45 cycles to flush out the effect by
the PdM system. Hence, if maintenance is due around that
period, it may lead to catastrophic consequences. Once again,
the piece-wise RUL prediction results indicate that employing
CNN in PdM systems may result in systems that are very
sensitive to the FDIA and hence special measures should be
taken for designing a CNN-based PdM.
D. Impact of sequence length on resiliency of GRU
Since GRU has performed best among the DL algo-
rithms as shown in the experimental results in the pre-
vious subsections, in Fig. 9 we compare four different
GRU networks under FDI attack. The GRU networks have
structures GRU1(100,100,100) lh(90), GRU2(100,100,100)
lh(80), GRU3(100,100,100) lh(70), and GRU4(100,100,100)
lh(60). We observe that the GRU network with architec-
ture GRU2(100,100,100) lh 80 has the least value of true
RMSE (5.36), which means that it predicts RUL quite ac-
curately, however, it is less resilient to both continuous and
interim FDIA. In contrast, GRU with network architecture
GRU3(100,100,100) lh(70) shows the second-best perfor-
mance in predicting the RUL (RMSE of 6.89), however, in
terms of resiliency, this network is the least affected by con-
tinuous and interim FDIA. This indeed shows an interesting
insight that the sequence length affects not only the accuracy
but also the resiliency of the model. It also indicates that
accuracy should not be the only factor while designing a
PdM system. For instance, in terms of accuracy GRU2 is the
typical choice. However, if both accuracy and resiliency are
considered, GRU3 is can be an ideal choice (at the cost of
losing some accuracy).
Fig. 9: RMSE comparison of different GRU networks
VI. DISCUSSION
In this work, we first evaluate different deep learning (DL)
algorithms on the C-MAPSS dataset and obtained results
show a great prospect for deep learning in PdM. It is also
observed that sequence length and network architecture are
crucial in predicting accurate RUL. Our work shows that the
GRU performed 1.3-1.9 times better than the recent works that
use deep learning on the C-MAPSS dataset [20], [22], [47].
The impact analysis of FDIA on aircraft sensors in the C-
MAPSS dataset provides some interesting insights. We observe
that CNN based PdM model is greatly affected by both random
and biased FDIA. In the case of interim FDIA, CNN’s random
and biased RMSE are 18 and 11 times higher than the true
RMSE, respectively, and in the case of continuous, the random
and biased RMSE are 6 and 4 times higher than the true
RMSE, respectively. We also observe that the GRU-based
PdM model is more resilient to both random and biased in
comparison with CNN and LSTM-based PdM models. Even
though the GRU is least affected by both random and biased
FDIA, their RMSE is 8 and 6 times higher than the true RMSE
in the case of continuous FDIA, respectively. In the case of
interim FDIA, the random and biased RMSE are 4 and 3 times
higher than the true RMSE, respectively, making it disastrous
for the PdM system. This may result in the delay of timely
maintenance for the aircraft engine and eventually result in
engine failure at some point. Note, the attack signature of
FDIA is very close to the original sensor output (within the
boundary conditions of the sensor measurements) making it
harder to be detected by common defense mechanisms in an
engine health monitoring (EHM) system.
A piece-wise RUL predicting approach is used in visualizing
the impact of attacks on the sensors, which clearly shows
that the PdM system is susceptible to sensor attacks. While
designing of PdM systems, the engineers should take both
continuous and interim FDI attacks into consideration. CNN
based piece-wise RUL prediction results show that special
measures should be taken when designing and adopting CNN-
based PdM systems (such as the cases in [23]–[25], [51]) as
they are very sensitive to the FDIA. Fig.9, gives an interesting
insight into the relationship between accuracy and resiliency
of the GRU network. It shows the need for considering the
relationship between the accuracy, resiliency and sequence
length of a DL mode (such as GRU in our case) in the
design phase. Indeed, such an analysis can serve as empirical
guidance to the development of subsequent data-driven PdM
systems.
All of these obtained results show that DL-based PdM
systems have a great prospect for aircraft maintenance, how-
ever, they are very susceptible to sensor attacks. Hence it is
required to investigate proper detection techniques to detect
such stealthy attacks and special care should be taken when
manufacturing IoT sensors for DL/AI applications. For the
same reason, while designing a PdM system, the designer also
must consider the resiliency of the DL algorithm instead of just
emphasizing on the algorithm’s accuracy, as we investigated
in this paper.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
This paper compares the performance of LSTM, GRU, and
CNN for RUL prediction using the C-MAPSS dataset, and
explores the impacts of continuous and interim FDI attacks
on these deep learning algorithms. We observe that the GRU
is a better suited DL technique when compared to LSTM and
CNN in terms of accuracy. The obtained results show that both
continuous and interim FDIA have a substantial impact on the
RUL prediction even if only a few IoT sensors are attacked.
We also observed that the GRU-based PdM model is more
resilient to FDIA, whereas CNN is dramatically sensitive to
both continuous and interim FDIA. Finally, we explored that
there exists a relationship between the accuracy and sequence
length in the GRU-based PdM model which can serve as
empirical guidance to the development of data-driven PdM
systems. In the future, we plan to develop an end-to-end
methodology for the detection and mitigation of sensor attacks
in a PdM system.
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